In 2010, I was offered work providing geologic intelligence to the Pentagon. I didn’t take it because I couldn’t be certain the information I provided would not be used to further destabilize the Middle East.
As a Sergeant, I was selected to attend an officer selection and training program run by a command that also provided advanced training to senior enlisted an officers of the United States Marine Corps and Navy. I went there in 1998 hoping I’d find a way to help Marines serving in the Middle East shut down the extremist networks that trained terrorists and guerrilla fighters for a war they hoped would erode western influence in the region. While that looked promising at first, as we were then developing lines of communication that would allow them to quickly request support, it would soon become evident that Congress was unwilling to provide the resources they would need.
I was frustrated by this, as were many others. The Naval Officer Training Command would respond by asking us to advocate for security improvements wherever we went next. That seemed a decent strategy, because most of us were headed for Naval Reserve Officer Training Commands scattered throughout the country. The problem was they asked us to do this knowing many of the officers who would oversee us at those commands preferred a different approach.
I’m not sure why, but although they too witnessed Saudi Arabia and other nations treating terrorist leaders with kit gloves, many officers thought that by cooperating more completely with them the situation would improve. My guess is that they suspected these nations would fall into line when they saw what our military could do. But, if Saudi Arabia’s decision to sanction the assassination of a U.S. reporter has shown us anything, it’s that they were unphased by it.
I suspect this is because many of the Middle Eastern nations we aligned ourselves with in an effort to rid the region of extremism secretly supported it in order to ensure we would not gain more influence than they did as a result. Nations play these games. We too did during the Cold War by secretly supporting both Iraq and Iran to ensure both were weakened by war. This is precisely why the Senate refused to work with Saudi Arabia until backed into a corner by those who secretly arranged for them to support anti-communist efforts in exchange for weaponry.
It’s hard to say who was playing who. For many it comes down to a feeling. Those who felt Saudi Arabia had no control over those anti-communist forces once they decided to turn on the United States would say we played them. Those who felt Saudi Arabia could have as easily developed a force to oppose them in response might feel otherwise.
I remained in the later camp in 2010, so I attended graduate school instead of working for the Pentagon. I thought it best we pull out of the region even then, because it was clear we weren’t reducing the number of enemy combatants and our so-called allies weren’t being all that helpful. A couple years later, with the discovery Osama bin Laden occupied a compound just outside a war college one of those allies operated apparently confirming my suspicion they secretly supported the extremist effort, I’d feel particularly relieved I did not provide intelligence that could have been passed along to them. He obviously had connections to that government if he felt safe enough to live just outside that facility.
Jamie Beaulieu
Farmington, Maine
